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AbstRAct
The aim of  this paper is to examine the potential effectiveness and limi-
tations of  the emerging corporate social disclosure laws that aim to increase 
transparency about human rights risks in global supply chains. Globalization 
has led to the emergence of  low cost, efficient (but risky) supply chains that 
span multiple sourcing countries which exhibit a wide range of  economic, 
political, social, labor and environmental standards. The five laws examined 
seek to provide mechanisms that aim to reduce the negative human rights 
impact of  business in supply chains. They introduce varying demands on 
business to map, track and disclose how and where their products are being 
made. This paper first briefly highlights the preponderance of  soft law that 
defines the business and human rights regulatory framework and guides 
corporate behavior. It then examines three mandated disclosure laws, the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act and the 
UK Modern Slavery Act and two due diligence focused laws, the Australian 
Illegal Logging Prohibition Act and the French Duty of  Corporate Vigi-
lance Law.  After which, it proposes criteria to strengthen the development 
and implementation of  these laws. It concludes by noting that while these 
laws are hardening the human rights expectations of  business, for them to 
generate substantive (and not just procedural) human rights compliance they 
must include: detailed requirements on reporting and due diligence; colla-
boration with external stakeholders; and compliance mechanisms. Through 
analysis of  these regulatory developments this paper seeks to provide grea-
ter understanding of  how to shape regulatory responses to governance gaps 
in transnational supply chains. 
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Resumo
O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a potencial efi-
cácia e limitações das leis emergentes de divulgação 
social corporativa que visam aumentar a transparência 
sobre os riscos de direitos humanos nas cadeias de for-
necimento globais. A globalização levou ao surgimen-
to de cadeias de suprimentos eficientes, mas de baixo 
custo, que abrangem múltiplos países fornecedores que 
exibem uma ampla gama de padrões econômicos, po-
líticos, sociais, trabalhistas e ambientais. As cinco leis 
examinadas procuram fornecer mecanismos que visam 
reduzir o impacto negativo dos direitos humanos dos 
negócios nas cadeias de fornecimento. Eles introduzem 
demandas variadas nas empresas para mapear, rastrear 
e divulgar como e onde seus produtos estão sendo fei-
tos. Este artigo primeiro destaca brevemente a prepon-
derância da soft law que define a estrutura regulatória 
dos negócios e dos direitos humanos e orienta o com-
portamento corporativo. Em seguida, examina três leis 
de divulgação obrigatórias, a Lei Dodd-Frank, a Lei de 
Transparência na Cadeia de Suprimentos da Califórnia 
e a Lei de Escravidão Moderna do Reino Unido e duas 
leis focadas em devida diligência, a Lei de Proibição de 
Madeira Legal e o Direito Francês de Vigilância Cor-
porativa. Depois disso, propõe critérios para fortale-
cer o desenvolvimento e a implementação dessas leis. 
Conclui-se observando que, embora essas leis estejam 
endurecendo as expectativas de direitos humanos nos 
negócios, para que elas gerem conformidade com os di-
reitos humanos substantivos (e não apenas processuais), 
elas devem incluir: requisitos detalhados sobre relató-
rios e due diligence; colaboração com partes interessadas 
externas; e mecanismos de conformidade. Por meio da 
análise desses desenvolvimentos regulatórios, este do-
cumento busca fornecer uma compreensão maior de 
como moldar as respostas regulatórias às lacunas de 
governança nas cadeias de fornecimento transnacionais.
Palavras-chave: Negócios. Direitos humanos. Escravidão 
moderna. Revelação. Devida diligencia. Transparência. 
1. IntRoductIon
Global supply chains now ‘account for more than 
450 million jobs worldwide’1 and are present in a mul-
1  G20 MINISTERIAL DECLARATION. Towards an inclusive 
tiplicity of  countries with varying economic, political, 
social, labor and environmental standards. Increasing 
attention is being paid to the potential negative impacts 
corporate operations may have on the rights of  workers 
in these global supply chains. This heightened attention 
has led, in part, to increased consideration of  how such 
negative impacts can best be prevented and addressed 
and raises questions about the appropriate regulatory 
roles that should be assigned to government, business 
and/or civil society. 
The application of  human rights to corporate opera-
tions has long depended on the slow and steady evolu-
tion of  voluntary initiatives that seek to garner corporate 
compliance with international human rights standards. 
The implementation and monitoring of  such initiatives 
has largely relied on self-regulation by business, along-
side the coercive voice of  civil society.  Writing in 2008, 
then United Nations (UN) Special Representative for 
Business and Human Rights noted that ‘the root cause 
of  the business and human rights predicament today 
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization – 
between the scope and impact of  economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of  societies to manage their ad-
verse consequences.’2 That is, corporations often ope-
rate in countries that do not have the capacity or will 
to protect the rights of  those within their jurisdiction; 
as a result, their activities are difficult to monitor and 
regulate, and wrongs often remain without redress. In 
response, civil society has often taken the lead in en-
couraging, coercing and often shaming corporations to 
address their impact on human rights. 
The relatively recent development of  state-based le-
gislative initiatives that focus on generating greater trans-
parency in supply chains (and sometimes requiring com-
panies to conduct due diligence) is starting to change 
this dynamic and hardening human rights requirements 
for business. What is less clear, is whether such disclosu-
re and due diligence requirements are capable of  linking 
transparency with accountability and generating subs-
tantive (not just procedural) human rights compliance.
future: shaping the world of  work: G20 labor and employment 
ministers meeting. 2017. Available in: <http://www.g20.utoronto.
ca/2017/170519-labour.html>.
2  HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL. Protect, respect and remedy: a 
framework for business and human rights: report of  the Special 
Representative of  the Secretary-General on the Issue of  Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises, John Ruggie. 2008. Available in: <http://www.refworld.org/
docid/484d2d5f2.html>.
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Over the last 30 years, there has been an emphasis 
on the  development of  ‘soft law’ aimed at regulating 
the impact of  business practices on human rights, for 
instance, through multi-stakeholder initiatives, institu-
tional declarations or guidelines, or industry codes of  
conduct.3 What this aims to do in practice is to harness 
the power of  business to positively impact human ri-
ghts by providing frameworks and guidance that assist 
companies in understanding what constitutes respon-
sible business conduct. The utility of  these initiatives 
has not been so much their ability to act as a tool of  
legal accountability but rather, to engage with com-
panies and enable them to better understand the con-
temporary responsibilities of  business with respect to 
human rights. The ‘rules’ for guiding responsible bu-
siness conduct (such as they exist) have been sourced 
not only from codified law (generally jurisdictionally 
confined, such as domestic health and safety laws) but 
also stem from sources as diverse as privately drafted 
codes of  conduct to internationally formulated guiding 
principles - so-called soft law standards that help guide 
corporate respect for human rights. Regulation in this 
context ‘goes beyond legal rules and mechanisms and 
also comprises political, social, economic and psycho-
logical pressures.’4 The adoption by the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2011 of  the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights,5 firmly entrenched the 
concept of  a corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights.6 This responsibility stems from a social expecta-
3  RATNER, S. Corporations and human rights: a theory of  le-
gal responsibility. Yale Law Journal, v. 111, 2001-2002; KINLEY, D.; 
TADAKI, J. From talk to walk: the emergence of  human rights re-
sponsibilities for corporations at international law. Virginia Journal 
of  International Law, v. 44, n. 4, 2004; UTTING, P. Rethinking business 
regulation: from self-regulation to social control. 2005. Available in: 
<http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/462fc27b
d1fce00880256b4a0060d2af/f02ac3db0ed406e0c12570a10029bec8
/$FILE/utting.pdf>.
4  CHARLESWORTH, H. A regulatory perspective on the in-
ternational human rights system. In: DRAHOS, P. Regulatory theory: 
foundations and applications. Australia: ANU Press, Acton ACT, 
2017. p.357–374. p. 361.
5  HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL. Guiding principles on business 
and human rights: implementing the united nations “protect, respect 
and remedy” framework. 2011. Available in: <https://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf>.
6  The Special Representative commented in 2010 that the corpo-
rate responsibility to respect rights is a notion that has been gradu-
ally emerging and is ‘acknowledged in virtually every voluntary and 
soft-law instrument related to corporate responsibility, and now af-
firmed by the Human Rights Council itself.’ RUGGIE, J. The UN 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework for business and human rights. 
tion (not legal obligation) to respect human rights and 
soft nature of  this responsibility is reflected in the re-
commendatory nature of  the language employed.7 The 
Guiding Principles embody an approach which employs 
a mix of  soft and hard law (with the latter reserved for 
the state duty component) to encourage respect for hu-
man rights. Stevelman argues that they are based on a 
complementary ‘synthesis of  hard and soft law – the 
soft law mandates pick up on the space left by voids in 
hard law, and support and amplify the tents of  hard law 
where they do overlap.’8
During this period of  the ongoing development of  
the business and human rights framework, the potential 
regulatory role of  government has at times appeared to 
be subservient to that of  the regulatory power of  civil 
society or the self-regulatory role of  business in seeking 
compliance with human rights.9 While it remains the 
2010. Available in: <http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-protect-respect-
remedy-framework.pdf>. This stands in contrast to earlier views by 
economist Milton Friedman who argued that it was a ‘fundamental 
misconception of  the character and nature of  the free economy’ 
for a corporation to have any concern other than maximization of  
profit. FRIEDMAN, M. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press, 1962. p.133; HENDERSON, D. Misguided virtue: 
false notions of  corporate social responsibility. Institute of  Public 
Affairs. 2001. p. 147. Available in: <https://iea.org.uk/publica-
tions/research/misguided-virtue-false-notions-of-corporate-social-
responsibility>. p.147.
7  For example, Guiding Principle No. 13 (“The responsibility to 
respect human rights requires that business enterprises: ... (b) Seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts”); Guiding Prin-
ciple No. 23 (“In all contexts, business enterprises should: ... (b) Seek 
ways to honour the principles of  internationally recognized human 
rights when faced with conflicting requirements”), Guiding Princi-
ples n5.
8  STEVELMAN, F. Global finance, multinationals and human 
rights: with commentary on backer’s critique of  the 2008 report by 
John Ruggie. Santa Clara Journal of  International Law, v. 9, n. 1, p. 
101-145, 2011. p. 116. For an overview of  the challenges of  utiliz-
ing private regulation and soft law in this field see: LOCKE, R. The 
promise and limits of  private power. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013; SOBCZAK, A. Are codes of  conduct in global supply 
chains really voluntary: from soft law regulation of  labour relations 
to consumer law. Business Ethics Quarterly, v. 16, n. 2, p. 167-184, 2006; 
PARIOTTI, E. International soft law, human rights and non-state 
actors: towards the accountability of  transnational corporations? 
Hum Rights, v. 10, p.139–155, 2009; BACCARO, L.; MELE, V. For 
Lack of  Anything Better? International Organizations and Global 
Corporate Codes. Public Administration, v. 89, n. 2, p. 451–470, 2011; 
DEVA, S. Regulating corporate human rights violations. London: Rout-
ledge, 2012; and CRAGG, W. Business and human rights: a principle and 
value-based analysis. 2012. Available in: <https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/290790009_Business_and_Human_Rights_A_
Principle_and_Value-Based_Analysis>.
9 LOCKE, R. The promise and limits of  private power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013.
N
O
LA
N
, J
us
tin
e. 
H
ar
de
ni
ng
 so
ft 
law
: a
re
 th
e 
em
er
gi
ng
 c
or
po
ra
te
 so
cia
l d
isc
lo
su
re
 la
w
s c
ap
ab
le 
of
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
?. 
Re
vi
st
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
15
, n
. 2
, 2
01
8 
p.
 6
4-
83
68
primary duty of  government to protect human rights 
(including protecting individuals from harm by third 
parties such as corporations), the unwillingness and/
or inability of  many governments to fulfil their human 
rights obligations has led to protection gaps that criti-
cally impact workers in supply chains.10 However, the 
development of  recent corporate disclosure laws (such 
as the United Kingdom’s (UK) 2015 Modern Slavery 
Act) and due diligence requirements (such as the French 
Corporate Duty of  Vigilance Law11) focused on supply 
chains, has reignited interest in the complementary re-
gulatory role of  government in this field. Such laws are 
hardening responsible business conduct principles, that 
have more traditionally been cast in a soft format. At a 
meeting of  the G20 group of  countries in 2017, 12 there 
was clear acknowledgement that it is the responsibility 
of  governments to ‘communicate clearly on what we 
[government] expect from businesses with respect to 
responsible business conduct’.13 
This article provides an overview of  some of  the 
recent corporate social disclosure and due diligence le-
gislative initiatives aimed at increasing transparency in 
global supply chains. The article distinguishes between 
those laws that focus purely on disclosure and those 
that include an explicit requirement of  due diligence 
and a state-based compliance mechanism. It illustra-
tes how these laws are (to varying extents) hardening 
the human rights expectations of  business that have 
previously and predominantly been set out in soft law 
frameworks. This article first examines three mandated 
disclosure laws (the United States’ (US) Dodd-Frank 
Act, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 
and the UK’s Modern Slavery Act) and two laws that 
expressly incorporate a due diligence requirement alon-
gside their mandated social disclosures (the Australian 
Illegal Logging Prohibition Act and the French Duty 
of  Corporate Vigilance Law). The first three laws have 
been selected because they are the first three major laws 
to adopt this approach and deliberately target corporate 
10 2008 Report, n2.
11 Loi de Vigilance No. 2017-339 of  2017.
12 The G20 (or Group of  Twenty) is an international forum for 
the governments and central bank governors from 20 major econo-
mies (19 countries plus the European Union). See: HAMBURG. 
G20 summit 2017. Available in: <http://www.hamburg.com/g20-
2017/>.
13 G20 MINISTERIAL DECLARATION. Towards an inclusive 
future: shaping the world of  work: G20 labor and employment 
ministers meeting. 2017. Available in: <http://www.g20.utoronto.
ca/2017/170519-labour.html>.
social disclosure as a mechanism to improve the trans-
parency of  corporate human rights impacts in global 
supply chains. The last two laws are examined to highli-
ght their due diligence component and considers the 
distinction between this approach versus simple disclo-
sures.  The article then turns to examine what corporate 
social disclosure and human rights due diligence laws 
should include in order to be an effective tool that will 
assist in preventing corporate human rights abuses. It 
questions whether some of  the current legislative tren-
ds are focused more on promoting procedural disclosu-
re and as such, may not significantly contribute to long 
term substantive human rights improvement.   
2. the emeRgence of mAndAted coRpoRAte 
socIAl dIsclosuRe And due dIlIgence lAws 
With the introduction of  section 1502 of  the Dodd 
Frank Act in 2010,14 US policy makers put business 
on notice that companies need to be more transparent 
about their sourcing strategies and mandated corpora-
te social disclosure as a means of  achieving this. This 
law creates a reporting requirement for publicly traded 
companies in the US with products containing specific 
conflict minerals. The purpose of  this provision is to 
provide greater transparency about how the trade in mi-
nerals is potentially fueling and funding the armed stru-
ggle in the Democratic Republic of  the Congo; functio-
nally, it relies on the adverse reputational impact of  such 
a disclosure rather than mandating penalties for actually 
sourcing minerals from conflict-afflicted regions.15 The 
law was quickly followed by the passage of  California’s 
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA) in 2010, 
which came into effect in 2012.16 The CTSCA requires 
large retail and manufacturing firms to disclose efforts 
to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their 
supply chains and is another example of  mandated 
corporate social disclosure. The adoption of  the UK’s 
14  Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2010 
Section 1502.
15 Section 1502 does impose penalties for not reporting or com-
plying in good faith. Also, the information filed by companies is sub-
ject to s18 of  the Securities Exchange Act 1934 which attaches liability 
for any false or misleading statements. 
16 BIRKEY, R. et al. Mandated social disclosure: an analysis of  
the response to the California transparency in supply chains act 
2010. Journal of  Business Ethics, p. 1-15, 2016. Available in: <https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10551-016-3364-7>.
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Modern Slavery Act in 2015 focused broader corporate 
attention on the use of  legislative disclosure require-
ments to address the human rights impacts of  business. 
Section 54 of  the Modern Slavery Act requires specified 
commercial organizations which supply goods or servi-
ces in the UK to disclose information about their efforts 
to address modern slavery in their supply chains.17 The 
rationale behind these types of  reporting requirements 
is that the reputational implications of  forced disclosu-
re will compel companies to undertake human rights 
focused examination of  their supply chain practices. 
Each of  these three laws is quite specific in its focus, 
with the Dodd-Frank Act inquiring only about the pre-
sence of  conflict minerals and the UK and Californian 
laws focusing on disclosures about modern slavery.18 
The laws only require companies to report on their 
sourcing and (possibly) their due diligence practices but 
do not require them to act on their findings or express-
ly conduct due diligence to facilitate such reporting on 
corporate souring practices.19 The assumption in this 
disclosure model appears to be that the transparency 
gained from disclosure will incentivize corporate action 
to address human rights risks, because of   the greater 
visibility of  these risks that will be evident  to inves-
tors and consumers. It relies on the voices of  external 
stakeholders to hold companies to account by assessing 
and critiquing the corporate reports. The model marks a 
shift from state regulators’ traditional role in overseeing 
purely financial (as opposed to social) disclosures but 
shifts the responsibility of  regulation to non-state ac-
tors.20 
Initial analysis of  the various statements submitted 
under these laws indicate that, to date, the corporate 
responses tend to be more symbolic than substantive. 
For example, in a study by Sarfaty analyzing the first sta-
17  See Appendix A for more details about these laws.
18  Modern slavery is not defined in international law but is pre-
dominantly used as an umbrella term to encompass various forms 
of  coercion that are prohibited in international legal instruments in-
cluding slavery, forced labor, trafficking in persons and forced mar-
riage. The relevant offences under the United Kingdom’s Modern 
Slavery Act include slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor 
and human trafficking. Modern Slavery Act 2015 UK Part 1.
19  Recent litigation in the US has confirmed this approach 
with specific reference to the CTSCA: Barber v Nestlé USA Inc No. 
8:2015cv01364 (C.D. Cal. December 14, 2015); Hodson v Mars, Inc No 
4:2015cv04450 (N.D. Cal, February 17, 2016); Sud v Costco Wholesale 
Corporation No 3:2015cv03783 (N.D. Cal, January 24, 2016).
20  NELSON, A. The materiality of  morality: conflict minerals. 
Utah Law Review, p. 291-241, 2014.
tements issued under section 1502 of  the Dodd-Frank 
Act, she concluded that the reports issued a low level 
of  compliance with the requirements of  the law. 21 Even 
accounting for the fact that this type of  social disclosu-
res represents a new learning paradigm for companies, 
the analysis is revealing of  how many companies fai-
led to follow the basic procedural requirements of  the 
transparency provision. 
Similarly, early analysis of  the CTSCA and the Mo-
dern Slavery Act also indicates a tendency toward the 
production of  reports that minimally meet the procedu-
ral ‘tick the box’ requirements of  the laws. Year on year 
analysis of  compliance with the CTSCA shows some 
slight improvement with compliance requirements but 
still indicates that 48% of  companies are not complying 
with the basic disclosure requirements of  the law.22 Ano-
ther study concluded that ‘analysis of  the extensiveness 
of  the disclosure suggests that, overall, the responses 
tend to be more symbolic than substantive’.23 Various 
studies conducted on the corporate statements issued 
under the Modern Slavery Act also indicate mixed re-
sults.  While select corporate statements have been prai-
sed, more generally the law has engendered a corporate 
response that falls short of  any serious effort to address 
modern slavery in their supply chains.24  With both the 
21  SARFATY, G. Shining a light on global supply chains. Harvard 
International Law Journal, v. 56, n. 2, p.419-463, 2015. p. 423. Sar-
faty’s study of  the first set of  Conflict Minerals Reports submitted 
to the Securities Exchange Commission up to June 2014 argues that 
these reports exhibited a low level of  compliance with due diligence 
requirements and identified several obstacles to achieving broader 
compliance, including that: ‘(i) international norms on supply chain 
due diligence are in their infancy; (ii) the proliferation of  certifi-
cation standards and in-region sourcing initiatives are still evolving 
and often competing; and (iii) inadequate local security and weak 
governance inhibit the mapping of  mineral trade and the tracing of  
minerals in the region’.
22  BAYER C.; HUDSON, J. Corporate compliance with the Cali-
fornia transparency in supply chains act: anti-slavery performance in 
2016. 2017. p. 5. Available in: <https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5862e332414fb56e15dd20b9/t/58bf06e346c3c478cf7
6d619/1488914152831/CA-TISCA.v.24_secured.pdf>. 
23  BIRKEY, R. et al. Mandated social disclosure: an analysis of  
the response to the California transparency in supply chains act 
2010. Journal of  Business Ethics, p. 1-15, 2016. Available in: <https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10551-016-3364-7>.
24  BENJAMIN, T.; PURVIS, J. G. Corporate supply chain trans-
parency: California’s seminal attempt to discourage forced labour. 
The International Journal of  Human Rights, v. 20, n. 1, p. 55-77, 2016; 
ERGON ASSOCIATES. Reporting on modern slavery: the current state 
of  disclosure. 2016. Available in:  <http://www.ergonassociates.
net/images/stories/articles/ergonmsastatement2.pdf>; CORE 
COALITION; BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE 
CENTRE. Register of  slavery & human trafficking corporate statements re-
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Californian and UK laws there is no central repository 
where the corporate statements are held, and in the UK 
there is no official public list detailing which companies 
need to report. These shortcomings make the job of  
conducting a comparative analysis of  reports more chal-
lenging and are not conducive to enabling consumers, 
investors and civil society more broadly to act as com-
pliance enablers. In addition, the lack of  comparably 
structured statements complicates comparability analy-
sis both within sectors and from year to year.25 Com-
pliance with the disclosure requirements set out in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the CTSCA and the Modern Slavery 
Act depend largely on the pressure exerted by external 
parties – consumers, investors, civil society – to indu-
ce compliance. As the table in Appendix 126 illustrates, 
these three laws do not build in express penalties in the 
form of  fines or criminal liability for non-compliance, 
but rather rely on a mix of  public and private regulatory 
techniques to achieve compliance. While research on 
mandated corporate environmental disclosures (which 
have been operating in various jurisdictions for a lon-
ger time) shows that reporting may improve over time, 
the development of  more substantive responses is  in-
fluenced by a number of  factors, including the potential 
reputational risk of  exposure faced by companies who 
do not comply with reporting requirements.27 For this 
type of  regulatory model to be effective, the disclosure 
requirements should be cast in such a way so that the 
risk of  detection of  non-compliance can be more easily 
uncovered by external stakeholders.
Ultimately, the imposition of  these corporate dis-
closure requirements is part of  the larger challenge of  
determining ‘when, how, and why might we expect im-
leased to date to comply with uk modern slavery act 2016.
25  KNOW THE CHAIN. Five years of  the California transparency in 
supply chains act. 2015. Available in: <https://knowthechain.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.
pdf>.
26  The information in the table in Appendix I is drawn from the 
laws themselves and also summaries of  the laws provided in the 
following reports: FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION. Supply chain trace-
ability and transparency: shifting industry norms, emerging regulations, 
and greater interest from civil society. 2017. Available in: <http://
www.fairlabor.org/blog/entry/supply-chain-traceability-and-trans-
parency>.  and BUSINESS HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESOURCE 
CENTRE; ITUC CSI IGB. Modern slavery in company operations and 
supply chains: mandatory transparency, mandatory due diligence and 
public procurement due diligence. 2017. Available in: <https://
www.ituc-csi.org/modern-slavery-in-company>.
27  BERTHELOT, S.; CORMIER, D.; MAGNAN, M. Environ-
mental disclosure research: review and synthesis. Journal of  Accounting 
Literature, v. 22, p. 1–44, 2003. p. 2.
provement in the treatment of  workers in global supply 
chains?’28 The Dodd-Frank Act, the CTSCA and the 
Modern Slavery Act are three examples of  mandated 
social disclosure laws that appear to draw, in part, on the 
regulatory theories of  responsive regulation29 and ne-
tworked governance,30 which (broadly) argue that regu-
lators should first consider the extent to which business 
is effective at regulating itself  when determining the ex-
tent to which a regulator will intervene. The laws seek 
to draw a compromise between the strong regulation 
of  business on the one hand and deregulation on the 
other and instead look to optimize a mix of  public and 
private regulation to achieve compliance. In this con-
text, these three laws focus on compliance in a narrow 
sense of  being ‘obedient to a regulatory obligation,’31 
with the primary obligation being to report. Complian-
ce may also be considered in a broader sense of  acting 
in a way that will achieve a policy goal, such as eradica-
ting modern slavery. This broader sense of  compliance 
is more readily apparent in the two due diligence laws 
discussed below which require explicit corporate beha-
vior responses (by conducting due diligence).
Each of  the three laws discussed above, incorpora-
te a mix of  both hard and soft approaches to addres-
sing human rights risks in supply chains. The mandated 
transparency requirement hardens expectations around 
reporting of  social issues, but the ambiguity around 
compliance softens the approach. The role of  the go-
vernment in these regimes is essentially to act as the 
orchestrator of  private actors to encourage compliance 
and is a move away from the more traditional ‘com-
mand and control’ approach that is more likely to figure 
in much domestic legislation. However, it is not obvious 
that this tactic is proving to be effective nor that disclo-
sure alone will guarantee improved outcomes. A 2017 
review by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights 
on the operation of  the Modern Slavery Act reinforces 
28  BERLINER, D. et. al. Governing global supply chains: what 
we know (and don’t) about improving labor rights and working con-
ditions. Annual Review of  Law and Social Science, v. 11, n. 1, p. 193–209, 
2015.
29  AYRES, A.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: tran-
scending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992.
30  GRABOSKY P. Beyond responsive regulation: the expand-
ing role of  non-state actors in the regulatory process. Regulation and 
Governance, v. 7, n. 1, p.114-123, mar. 2013.
31  PARKER, C.; NIELSEN, V. Lehmann. Compliance: 14 ques-
tions. In: DRAHOS, P. Regulatory theory: foundations and applica-
tions. Australia: ANU Press, Acton ACT, 2017. p. 357–374.
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this assumption. The Committee cited evidence that 
35% of  statements under the Modern Slavery Act did 
not discuss risk assessment processes, and two thirds 
of  statements did not identify priority risks.32 Rather, 
most companies were simply disclosing general infor-
mation about their existing policies.33 Ultimately, the 
Joint Committee recommended the introduction of  
legislation mandating human rights due diligence as a 
means of  hardening compliance with human rights ex-
pectations.34
Due diligence is a concept that is gaining traction 
in the business and human rights field. Human rights 
due diligence is an integral component of  the Guiding 
Principles and its effective development and implemen-
tation is noted as a shared responsibility of  both gover-
nment and business. Government action to encourage 
companies to respect human rights should include pro-
viding clarity around concepts such as due diligence and 
setting standards for communicating these efforts to the 
broader community. The concept of  due diligence was 
introduced in the Guiding Principles as a mechanism by 
which companies might discharge their responsibility 
to respect rights and reflects the continued reliance on, 
what had been to date (as at and prior to 2011, when 
the principles were introduced), a largely self-regulatory 
process to address corporate human rights violations. 
Human rights due diligence, as set out in the Guiding 
Principles, is basically comprised of  four key elements. 
Namely, businesses are expected to: (1) assess their ac-
tual and potential adverse human rights impacts; (2) 
integrate these findings internally and take appropriate 
preventative and mitigating action; (3) track the effecti-
veness of  their response; and (4) publicly communicate 
how they are addressing their human rights impacts.35 
Guiding Principle 17 sets out the basic parameters of  
the recommended due diligence process and notes that 
human rights due diligence may cover impacts a busi-
ness causes, contributes or is directly linked to it via its 
32  ERGON ASSOCIATES. Reporting on modern slavery: the cur-
rent state of  disclosure. 2016. Available in:  <http://www.ergonas-
sociates.net/images/stories/articles/ergonmsastatement2.pdf>. 
HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COM-
MITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Human rights and business 2017: 
promoting responsibility and ensuring accountability. p.37-38. Avail-
able in: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/
jtselect/jtrights/443/443.pdf>. 
33  Written evidence from the Equality and Human Rights Com-
mission in the UK Joint Committee Report, n32, p38.
34  UK Joint Committee Report, n32, p59.
35  Guiding Principles n5, Principle 15(b), 17-21 
operations and relationships,  and will vary in complexi-
ty according to the size of  the business and the severity 
of  risk.36 
A key feature that distinguishes human rights due 
diligence from traditional corporate due diligence, is its 
ongoing nature and that it focuses primarily on detec-
ting the risks that the company may impose on others, 
as opposed to risks to the company.37 While due dili-
gence as set out in the Guiding Principles applies to a 
range of  situations in which businesses may potentially 
impact human rights, one of  the most common (and 
significant) human rights challenges faced by business 
today is that associated with its reliance on global supply 
chains.  However, none of  the three supply chain regu-
latory approaches analyzed above that mandate social 
disclosures expressly impose a legal obligation on com-
panies to conduct such due diligence. 
Since the advent of  the Guiding Principles in 2011, 
there have been significant advances in further defining 
and refining the concept of  due diligence, and in some 
instances (discussed below), legally mandating compa-
nies to conduct such assessments. Recently, detailed 
guidance has begun to emerge (developed by both state 
and non-state actors) which attempts to outline what 
a comprehensive supply chain due diligence program 
should look like. The OECD’s work in this area has 
been ongoing for many years and its most recent gui-
dance documents reflect and expand on the framework 
set out in the Guiding Principles. 38 The Dutch Agree-
ment on Sustainable Garment and Textile, established 
in 2016, is an example of  a sector specific soft law ap-
36  Guiding Principles n5, Principle 17.
37 MCCORQUODALE, R.; BONNITCHA, J. The concept of  
“Due Diligence” in the UN guiding principles on business and hu-
man rights. European Journal of  International Law, v. 28, 2017.
38  The OECD has been particularly active in this space and 
has produced a 2018 report on responsible business conduct 
along with sector specific guidelines. ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Due 
diligence guidance for responsible business conduct OECD publishing. 2018. 
Available in: <http://www.oecd.org/investment/due-diligence-
guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct.htm>.  ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT. Due diligence guidance for responsible supply chains of  minerals from 
conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 2016. Available in:  <http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264252479-en>; ORGANISATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Due diligence 
guidance for responsible supply chains in the garment and footwear sector. 2017. 
Available in: <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/oecd-due-diligence-
guidance-garment-footwear.pdf>.
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proach to facilitating human rights due diligence. 39 It is 
a sector-based agreement between sector associations, 
member companies, government, trade unions and ci-
vil society organizations by which they work together 
to identify and address risks to human rights (including 
labor rights), environmental impacts, impacts related to 
corruption and taxation practices and other negative 
impacts covered by the OECD Guidelines for Multina-
tional Enterprises and the Guiding Principles. Throu-
gh policies such as this, the Dutch government aims 
to encourage the implementation of  due diligence on 
a voluntary basis. To date, two agreements have been 
reached, one in the garment and textile sector and the 
other in banking. Alongside these high level govern-
mental and inter-governmental led efforts to encourage 
voluntary due diligence are guidelines that have been 
developed by civil society to further define and refine 
human rights due diligence.40 
However, despite the proliferation of  discussions 
on due diligence, its practical implementation appears 
limited.  A 2017 report by the Corporate Human Rights 
Benchmark reported low levels of  due diligence prac-
tice and reporting. 41 Similarly, a survey conducted by 
39  SOCIAAL-ECONOMISCHE RAAD. Agreement on Sustainable 
Garment and Textile. Available in:  <http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/
AgreementOnSustainableGarmentAndTextile.pdf>; SOCIAAL-
ECONOMISCHE RAAD. Dutch Banking sector agreement on inter-
national responsible business conduct regarding human rights. 2016. Avail-
able in: <https://www.ser.nl/~/media/files/internet/publicaties/
overige/2010_2019/2016/dutch-banking-sector-agreement.ashx>.
40  For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative has developed a 
Human Rights Due Diligence Framework, the Danish Institute 
for Human Rights has its Human Rights Impact and Assessment 
Guidance and Toolbox, and Shift has also developed guidance 
around due diligence. See: DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS. Human Rights Impact and Assessment Guidance and Toolbox. 
Available in: <https://www.humanrights.dk/sites/humanrights.
dk/files/media/dokumenter/business/hria_toolbox/introduc-
tion/welcome_and_introduction_final_may2016.pdf_223791_1_1.
pdf>.; SHIFT. Respecting human rights through global supply chains shift 
workshop report n. 2. 2012. Available in:  <https://www.shiftproject.
org/media/resources/docs/Shift_UNGPssupplychain2012.pdf>.
41  Its 2017 report tracking the performance of  98 publicly traded 
companies in the agricultural products, apparel and extractives sec-
tors found that only one-third of  companies had attempted to iden-
tify their human rights risks, 20% had integrated and acted on those 
risks, 18% had tracked the effectiveness of  those risks and only 2% 
of  companies had publicly communicated their effectiveness. COR-
PORATE HUMAN RIGHTS BENCHMARK. Key Findings 2017. 
2017.  Available in: <https://www.corporatebenchmark.org/>. The 
report tracks the performance of  98 publicly traded companies in 
the agricultural products, apparel, and extractives sectors. Compa-
nies are chosen on the basis of  size, revenues, geographic and indus-
try balance. The CHRB has a long-term goal of  eventually assessing 
Norton Rose Fulbright and the British Institute of  In-
ternational and Comparative Law42 found that over 50% 
of  companies surveyed had never undertaken a specific 
human rights due diligence process, These initial results 
indicate that six to seven years since the adoption of  the 
Guiding Principles, a majority of  companies are either 
not conducting or adequately reporting on their human 
rights due diligence practices. 
This lack of  progress might be attributed in part to 
the non-binding nature of  due diligence requirements 
at both the international and domestic level, however 
some recent legislative initiatives are seeking to chan-
ge that. The two laws, described in Appendix 1, that 
expressly focus on due diligence as a tool to drive 
compliance with social norms are the Illegal Logging 
Prohibition Act of  2012 from Australia and the French 
Corporate Duty of  Vigilance Law of  2017. The Ille-
gal Logging Prohibition Act incorporates due diligence 
requirements that obligate the importers and proces-
sors of  timber into Australia to initiate verification and 
certification processes aimed at ensuring the imported 
timber had not been illegally logged.43 If  an importer 
or processor intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly im-
ports or processes illegally logged timber, they could 
face significant penalties, including up to five years im-
prisonment and/ or heavy fines, however the criminal 
penalties do not apply to non-compliance with the due 
diligence requirements. The regulations attached to the 
Act provide clear guidance as to what will constitu-
te compliance with the due diligence requirements. 44 
the top 500 global companies: CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
BENCHMARK. Friends of  the CHRB. Available in: <https://busi-
ness-humanrights.org/en/corporate-human-rights-benchmark-0/
friends-of-the-chrb>. 
42  The survey covered 152 companies from a range of  sectors. 
MCCORQUODALE, R. et. al. Human rights due diligence in law 
and practice: good practices and challenges for business enterprises. 
Business and Human Rights Journal, v. 2, n. 2, p. 195-224, jul. 2017.
43  TURNER, R. J. Transnational supply chain regulation: extra-
territorial regulation as corporate law’s new frontier. Melbourne Jour-
nal of  International Law, v. 17, n. 1, p.188-209, 2016. 
44  The Illegal Logging Prohibition Amendment Regulation 2012 pro-
vides that: step 1 is information gathering (the importer must obtain 
as much of  the prescribed information as is reasonably practicable); 
step 2 is an option process that involves assessing and identifying 
risk against a prescribed timber legality framework (section 11) or a 
country-specific guideline (once they are prescribed); step 3 is risk 
assessment (section 13); and, step 4 is risk mitigation (section 14), 
which should be adequate and proportionate to the identified risk. 
Illegally logged timber is defined broadly in the Illegal Logging Prohibi-
tion Act 2012 (Cth) as timber ‘harvested in contravention of  laws in 
force in the place (whether or not in Australia) where the timber was 
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While narrowly targeted on a single sector, the Act has 
both an environmental and human rights focus as the 
impacts of  illegally logged timber can be widespread.45 
The French Corporate Duty of  Vigilance Law is 
much broader in scope (in that it applies to all human 
rights) but narrower in its application (it will apply to 
France’s largest companies as determined by the num-
ber of  employees). It also incorporates human rights 
due diligence as a key mechanism for improving respect 
for human right in supply chains. The broad purpose of  
the law is to require relevant businesses to identify risks 
and prevent serious violations of  human rights and fun-
damental freedoms to better protect the health and sa-
fety of  both people and the environment. As noted in 
Appendix 1, the law sets out the broad parameters of  
what adequate due diligence should look like and inclu-
des compliance mechanisms that incorporate potential 
regulatory roles for both public and private actors. 
While the Australian and French laws also incorpo-
rate social disclosure requirements there are two key 
distinctions between these due diligence focused laws 
and the three mandated social disclosure laws discussed 
above. Firstly, the Australian and French laws recognize 
that disclosure alone is likely to be insufficient to dri-
ve improved respect for human rights in supply chains. 
While transparency is part of  what the laws require, 
they also focus on the substantive actions business enti-
ties must take to understand and address human rights 
risks. That is, they require companies to conduct due 
diligence, and in so doing, develop plans and engage 
in detailed risk identification, assessment and mitiga-
tion. Secondly, both laws include mechanisms that go 
beyond primarily relying on naming and shaming tac-
tics from private actors to drive compliance. Not to say 
such tactics are not useful, but rather that alone, they 
are likely to be insufficient. As noted by Charlesworth 
‘the idea of  responsive regulation—first developed in 
the context of  business regulation—is [that it is] built 
on pyramids of  supports and pyramids of  sanctions.’46 
harvested’ (Section 7).  The due diligence requirements, as outlined 
in the Illegal Logging Prohibition Regulation 2012, came into ef-
fect on 30 November 2014. From 1 January 2018, businesses and 
individuals may face penalties for failing to comply with the due-
diligence requirements. Conducting the requisite due diligence can 
be used as a defense to negligence.
45  As well as causing environmental harm, illegal logging involves 
human rights abuses like violence against local communities, forced 
labor, and pollution of  vital water supplies.
46  CHARLESWORTH, H. A regulatory perspective on the in-
And indeed, Ayres and Braithwaite when developing 
their responsive regulatory theory, argued that ‘[r]egu-
latory agencies will be able to speak more softly when 
they are perceived as carrying big sticks.’47 What is mis-
sing from the three social disclosure laws discussed 
above, is the stick. Mechanisms to encourage corporate 
compliance with human rights may be offered both in 
the form of  positive inducements (such as compliance 
being a necessary qualification for public procurement 
contracts) and negative deterrents (such as fines or cri-
minal liability). Given the low levels of  compliance seen 
so far in relation to the Dodd-Frank Act, the CTSCA 
and the Modern Slavery Act, it is arguably necessary 
for the state to incorporate legal inducements or pe-
nalties in their compliance toolbox, alongside mecha-
nisms that facilitate compliance pressure from private 
actors. Encouragingly, there are a handful of  other laws 
emerging, in some jurisdictions, which also go beyond 
mandated transparency to include express due diligence 
requirements and compliance mechanisms, some with a 
narrow focus such as forced or child labor and others 
referencing human rights more broadly.48
3. towARds substAntIve complIAnce wIth 
humAn RIghts
Mandated transparency coupled with human rights 
due diligence are essential components of  any legisla-
tive initiative to regulate human rights impacts in cor-
porate supply chains. However, one should not assume 
that simply institutionalizing transparency or due dili-
ternational human rights system. In: DRAHOS, P. Regulatory theory: 
foundations and applications. Australia: ANU Press, Acton ACT, 
2017. p.357–374. p. 368.
47  AYRES, A.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: tran-
scending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992. p. 6.
48  Other legislative measures which require supply chain due 
diligence include: the US Trade Facilitation Act which allows US 
Customs to seize imported goods if  an importer is unable to pro-
vide a certificate proving which measures were taken ensure that the 
goods were not produced using forced labor. Under the proposed 
Dutch Child Labour Bill, companies would be required to issue a 
statement declaring that they have exercised due diligence to pre-
vent their goods and services being made using child labor. BUSI-
NESS HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESOURCE CENTRE; ITUC 
CSI IGB. Modern slavery in company operations and supply chains: manda-
tory transparency, mandatory due diligence and public procurement 
due diligence. 2017. p. 15. Available in: <https://www.ituc-csi.org/
modern-slavery-in-company>. 
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gence will automatically lead to improvements in cor-
porate behavior. What is key, is ensuring that the laws 
encourage a move toward substantive compliance with 
human rights rather than simply cosmetic compliance.49 
Substantive compliance here is understood to mean ac-
tions that are undertaken to satisfy the true objective 
of  the law - for example, practical steps to address and 
reduce modern slavery in supply chains - rather than 
simply directing actions toward the objective of  increa-
sing transparency about the problem. To do that, and 
substantively address the risks of  modern slavery, these 
laws must: (1) incorporate clear and detailed guidance 
on disclosure and due diligence requirements; (2) re-
quire collaboration with external stakeholders; and (3) 
provide for compliance mechanisms to couple transpa-
rency and due diligence with accountability.
3.1. Disclosure guidance
Detailed reporting requirements can assist in pro-
viding useful information to external stakeholders that 
allows civil society, potential business partners, investors 
and the public to evaluate company performance and 
identify best practice.50 Providing detailed guidance of  
what is expected of  all companies will also help ensure 
that those businesses that do disclose in some detail are 
not punished in the market-place for doing so, as it will 
‘level the playing field’ of  disclosure. Detailed informa-
tion is also necessary to help regulators evaluate whether 
self-regulation on an issue is working or if  some other 
approach is required. These disclosure requirements 
must include outcomes, not just processes. The law 
should include clear guidance for companies on what 
and how they report to enable the production of  consis-
tent and comparable reports that can be measured and 
improvements tracked over time. The lack of  initial gui-
dance provided to UK companies has been a criticism 
of  the Modern Slavery Act.51 Currently section 54(5) of  
the Modern Slavery Act outlines what a statement may 
include, but there is no prescribed form of  content or 
length for a statement. It is suggested that companies re-
49  KRAWIEC, K. D. Cosmetic compliance and the failure of  
negotiated governance. Washington University Law Quarterly, v. 81, p. 
487-544, 2003. 
50  PARKER, C. The open corporation: effective self-regulation and 
democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
51  ERGON ASSOCIATES. Reporting on modern slavery: the current 
state of  disclosure. 2016. Available in: <http://www.ergonassoci-
ates.net/images/stories/articles/ergonmsastatement2.pdf>.
port on six broad areas: business and supply chain struc-
ture, polices, due diligence, risk assessment, effectiveness 
and training. These topics for reporting are discretionary. 
Statements submitted to date lack consistency and many 
companies are not providing substantive disclosure in 
most of  the suggested areas. Uniform obligatory repor-
ting criteria should be included so that companies do not 
pick and choose which elements to report against. 
An essential element of  what companies should be 
reporting on is their due diligence efforts. Reporting is 
simply the final step in the process of  identify, assessing 
and addressing risks, and tracking the effectiveness of  
those responses. For reporting to be legitimate it must 
be based on effective due diligence. The Guiding Prin-
ciples provide a broad framework that sets out the ge-
neral parameters of  what companies should take into 
account in conducting human rights due diligence as-
sessments.52 They state that the ‘process should include 
assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, in-
tegrating and acting upon the findings, tracking respon-
ses, and communicating how impacts are addressed.’53 
However, the term ‘impacts’ – the crucial element to 
which due diligence is addressed – is not defined and 
it may be clearer to refer to violations of  international 
human rights, the terminology employed in the Fren-
ch law.54 As a high-level document, the Guiding Prin-
ciples employs imprecise language and anticipates that 
human rights due diligence will be further elaborated 
upon through negotiated standard-setting processes at a 
more concrete level (for example, on an sector by sector 
basis as has been done by the OECD). Supply chain ar-
rangements are not static55  and will vary from sector to 
sector and as such those laws that are narrowly targeted 
on a specific sector (such as the Illegal Logging Act) 
may be able to provide more precision in detailing what 
due diligence entails. However, the fundamental prin-
ciples of  due diligence (referred to in both the French 
and Australian Acts) include tracking and reporting on: 
risk identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation.
52  Guiding Principles, n5 Principles 17-20.
53  Guiding Principles, n n5, Principle 17.
54  Loi de Vigilance No. 2017-339 of  2017 Article 1. See also, 
DEVA, S. Treating human rights lightly: a critique of  the consensus 
rhetoric and the language employed by the guiding principles. In: 
DEVA, S.; BILCHITZ, D. Human rights obligations of  business: beyond 
the corporate responsibility to respect? Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2013.
55  GEREFFI, G.; HUMPHREY, J.; STURGEON, T. The gov-
ernance of  global value chains. Review of  International Political Econo-
my, v. 12, n. 1, p. 78–104, 2005. p. 96.
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3.2. Collaboration
General guidance provided by the OECD on due 
diligence stresses the need for companies to adopt a 
collaborative approach in their due diligence and repor-
ting efforts. For example, the OECD’s Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Gar-
ment and Footwear Sector emphasizes that due diligen-
ce is both an interactive and shared process, noting that 
enterprises ‘should engage meaningfully with affected 
stakeholders as part of  the due diligence process. Such 
engagement should be two-way, conducted in good fai-
th and responsive.’56 The OECD advises that business 
should engage with other companies in the sector, re-
levant multi-stakeholder institutions and directly with 
workers and their chosen representatives such as trade 
unions.57 This broad concept of  collaboration is distinct 
from social auditing, a process by which a company ve-
rifies supplier compliance with human rights standards, 
typically set out in a code of  conduct. While the precise 
nature of  a social audit will vary depending on the in-
dustry in question and the organisation undertaking the 
audit, it generally involves a physical inspection of  a fa-
cility (for example a factory, farm, mine or vessel), com-
bined with a review of  documents (to the extent that 
records are kept) and some interviews with manage-
ment and employees. 58 Social auditing may sometimes 
be a useful tool to identify non-compliance with human 
rights, and as such, a component, rather than the fo-
cal point of  human rights due diligence. However sole 
reliance on social auditing to satisfy legal requirements 
reflects a limited vision of  supply chain human rights 
due diligence.59 Broader and ongoing collaboration with 
56  OECD Apparel Guidance, n38 p.23. 
57  OECD Apparel Guidance, n38 p.24-26.
58 See for example, ISEAL ALLIANCE. Assuring compliance with 
social and environmental standards: code of  good practice. p. 5. Available 
in: <https://www.isealalliance.org/online-community/resources/
assurance-code-version-10>. (ISEAL Alliance Code of  Good Prac-
tice). The ISEAL Alliance is a multi-stakeholder initiative whose 
aim is to strengthen the sustainability standards of  MSIs (and other 
standard setting and accreditation bodies
59  There is now a growing body of  evidence indicating that 
social auditing is, in and of  itself, an ineffective tool for achiev-
ing meaningful and consistent human rights improvements. REI-
NECKE, J.; DONAGHEY, J. The ‘Accord for Fire and Building 
Safety in Bangladesh”’in response to the Rana Plaza disaster. In: 
MARX, A. et. al. (Ed.). Global governance of  labour rights: assessing the 
effectiveness of  transnational public and private policy initiatives. 
New York: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015; LOCKE, R.; AMEN-
GUAL, M.; MANGLA, A. Virtue out of  necessity? Compliance, 
Commitment, and the Improvement of  Labor Conditions in Global 
external stakeholders on the other hand, allows for an 
external check to ensure that the systems that are being 
implemented will be effective as they can provide input 
into the design and implementation of  those systems.60 
Companies may lead, but cannot complete the task of  
undertaking substantive human rights due diligence in 
isolation.
3.3. Compliance
Theoretically, it is realistic to assume that without 
any mechanism to encourage compliance with the le-
gal requirements of  transparency and due diligence, the 
uptake by companies may be limited.61 This has played 
out in practice via the implementation of  the Modern 
Slavery Act in the UK. The review of  the operation of  
the law by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights 
in 2017 suggested not only the inclusion of  manda-
tory due diligence to strengthen the current reporting 
requirements, but also the introduction of  civil (and 
criminal) penalties where human rights violations have 
occurred.62 Both the French and the Australian due 
diligence laws provide for the imposition of  civil pe-
nalties where companies have failed to implement due 
diligence plans.  Compliance here is not linked simply to 
Supply Chains. Politics & Society, v. 37, n. 3, 2009; O’ROURKE, D. 
Multi-stakeholder regulation: privatizing or socializing global labor 
standards? World Development, v. 34, n. 5, p. 899-907, 2006; CLEAN 
CLOTHES CAMPAIGN. Looking for a quick fix: how weak social 
auditing is keeping workers in sweatshops. 2005. p. 26-28, 32-39. 
Available in: <https://cleanclothes.org/resources/publications/05-
quick-fix.pdf/view>.; LEBARON, G.; LISTER, J. Speri Global Politi-
cal Economy Brief  n. 1: ethical audits and the supply chains of  Global 
Corporations. 2016. Available in: <http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Global-Brief-1-Ethical-Audits-and-the-
Supply-Chains-of-Global-Corporations.pdf>; INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION. Fishers first: good practices to end 
labour exploitation at sea. 2016. Available in: <http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/
publication/wcms_515365.pdf> 
60  GUNNINGHAM, G.; GRABOSKY, P. Smart regulation: de-
signing environmental policy. New York: Oxford Clarendon Press, 
1998. p. 247.
61  Regulatory theory assumes the necessary inclusion of  a gra-
dation of  mechanisms, ranging from self-regulation to external en-
forcement by the state, may be necessary in order for regulation to 
be effective, see AYRES, A.; BRAITHWAITE, J. Responsive regulation: 
transcending the deregulation debate. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992.
62  HOUSE OF LORDS, HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS. Human rights and business 
2017: promoting responsibility and ensuring accountability. p. 37-
38. p. 22. Available in: <https://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/443/443.pdf>. 
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a failure to report, but a failure to implement. Such laws 
could (as in the case of  the Australian law) provide that 
demonstrated good faith due diligence could be raised 
as a defence to, or at least a proportional mitigation of  
liability.63 Guidance in this respect could be obtained 
from various anti-bribery and corruption laws that have 
been implemented both nationally and internationally. 
The UK Bribery Act 2010, for example, takes into ac-
count the fact that companies implemented ‘adequate 
procedures’ to prevent bribery in their operations as a 
defence to a charge of  a company’s failure to prevent 
bribery.64 Provisions incorporating both penalties for, 
and defences to, alleged misconduct could give business 
a strong incentive to exercise due diligence, without 
depriving them of  the ability to defend themselves, or 
depriving victims of  a remedy for serious violations of  
human rights.65 Compliance mechanisms could also be 
offered in a way by the state that motivates corporate 
compliance, so that reporting and due diligence require-
ments must be met as a condition of  tendering for any 
public procurement contracts. Transparency and due 
diligence must be coupled with accountability in order 
to make the process meaningful. 
4. conclusIon
The emergence of  news laws to address the human 
rights risks in global supply chains provide a real op-
portunity to develop robust reporting and human rights 
due diligence standards that are capable of  effecting po-
sitive change. The establishment of  such legal standards 
is challenging in that it involves the necessary involve-
ment of  a multiplicity of  stakeholders and implementa-
tion across borders. However, such laws can and should 
63  MICHALOWSKI, S. Due diligence and complicity: a relation-
ship in need of  clarification. In: DEVA, S.; BILCHITZ, D. Human 
rights obligations of  business: beyond the corporate responsibility to re-
spect? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 218-242. 
64  CASSEL, D.; RAMASASTRY, A. White paper: options for a 
treaty on business and human rights. 2015. p. 99. Available in: <htt-
ps://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol6/iss1/4/>. Also, courts 
and the US Department of  Justice take certain factors into consid-
eration when assessing criminal fines for companies prosecuted un-
der the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act including:  whether high-
level personnel were involved in or condoned the conduct, whether 
the organization had a pre-existing compliance and ethics program, 
voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and acceptance of  responsibility.
65  CASSEL, D.; RAMASASTRY, A. White paper: options for a 
treaty on business and human rights. 2015. p. 99. Available in: <htt-
ps://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjicl/vol6/iss1/4/>.
build on the slow and steady evolution of  soft law that 
has been used to guide, cajole and sometimes coer-
ce companies to respect human rights in their supply 
chains. Whether in the form of  multi-stakeholder codes 
of  conduct or high-level institutional guidelines, there 
is an emerging consensus of  what companies must do 
to respect human rights. These emerging reporting and 
due diligence legal requirements provide an opportu-
nity to entrench those norms to ensure compliance is 
widespread. In developing laws to address supply chain 
risks, consideration should be given to ensuring that 
the reporting framework requires due diligence to be 
conducted, encourages collaboration with a variety of  
stakeholders and incorporates compliance mechanisms 
so that the efforts taken to address human rights risks 
are substantive rather than those that might engender 
a more process oriented cosmetic form of  compliance 
with human rights.
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AppendIx A – socIAl dIsclosuRe And  
due dIlIgence lAws
Type of  law Disclosure (& 
implied due dili-
gence)
Disclosure Due Diligence 
+ Civil Liability 
(fine)
Disclosure Due diligence 
+ Civil liability 
(fines + vulne-
rability to civil 
litigation)
Law US Dodd Frank 
Wall Street Re-
form and Con-
sumer Protection 
Act, 2010 Section 
1502 
California Tran-
sparency in Sup-
ply Chains Act, 
2010
Australia Illegal 
Logging Prohi-
bition Act 2012
UK Modern 
Slavery Act, 
2015 Section 54
France Corporate 
Duty of  Vigilance 
Law, 2017
  
Companies 
covered
Companies that 
use tantalum, tin, 
gold or tungsten 
if: the company 
files report with 
the SEC under 
the Exchange Act 
and the minerals 
are ‘necessary to 
the functionality 
or production’ 
of  a product 
manufactured or 
contracted to be 
manufactured by 
the company.
Manufacturers 
and retailers 
doing business 
in California 
with gross re-
ceipts more than 
$100 million
Applies to any 
person or com-
pany that im-
ports timber or 
timber products 
into Australia, 
or any dome-
stic processor 
of  Australian 
grown raw logs
Commercial or-
ganizations that 
provides goods 
or services and 
carry on busi-
ness in the UK 
with a global 
net turnover of  
£36 million or 
more
French compa-
nies with 5,000 
staff  in France 
or 10,000 staff  
globally
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Type of  law Disclosure (& 
implied due dili-
gence)
Disclosure Due Diligence 
+ Civil Liability 
(fine)
Disclosure Due diligence 
+ Civil liability 
(fines + vulne-
rability to civil 
litigation)
Transparency Publicly traded 
companies must 
submit to the 
SEC whether the 
minerals originate 
from the DRC or 
adjoining areas.
Companies must 
publicly disclose 
on their website 
their efforts to 
eradicate forced 
labor and hu-
man trafficking 
in their supply 
chains including: 
1. Use of  third 
party risk asses-
sment 
2. Independent 
supplier audits 
3.  Tier 1 sup-
plier certifica-
tions 
4. Internal ac-
countability me-
chanisms 
5. Internal trai-
ning
Importers of  
regulated timber 
products must 
provide decla-
rations, at the 
time of  import, 
to the Customs 
Minister about 
the due diligence 
that they have 
undertaken. The 
Act provides for 
inspectors to 
exercise monito-
ring, investiga-
tion and enfor-
cement powers.
Disclose in a 
statement on 
its websites to 
‘what extent, if  
any,’ the com-
pany: 1) verifies 
its product 
supply chains; 
2) audits its 
suppliers; 3) 
requires certi-
fications from 
direct suppliers; 
4) maintains in-
ternal accounta-
bility; and 5) 
trains company 
employees and 
management
The vigilance plan 
and its effective 
implementation 
report shall be 
publicly disclosed 
and included in 
the extra-financial 
report required  
for major French 
multinational cor-
porations. 
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Type of  law Disclosure (& 
implied due dili-
gence)
Disclosure Due Diligence 
+ Civil Liability 
(fine)
Disclosure Due diligence 
+ Civil liability 
(fines + vulne-
rability to civil 
litigation)
Due diligence No requirement 
to conduct due 
diligence but if  
the minerals are 
from DRC/area 
then companies 
must describe to 
the SEC the due 
diligence measures 
taken to determi-
ne the source of  
the minerals. 
None Regulations set 
out detailed due 
diligence requi-
rements inclu-
ding: informa-
tion gathering; 
risk identifica-
tion; risk asses-
sment and risk 
mitigation. 2017 
amendments will 
streamline due 
diligence process 
for timber pro-
ducts certified 
under the Forest 
Stewardship 
Council and 
Programme for 
the Endorse-
ment of  Forest 
Certification 
schemes.
None Companies must 
establish and 
implement a due 
diligence plan that 
states the measu-
res taken to iden-
tify and prevent 
the occurrence of  
human rights and 
environmental 
risks  resulting 
from their activi-
ties, the activities  
of  companies 
they control and 
the activities  of  
sub-contractors 
and suppliers; 
actions taken to 
mitigate risk; and 
an alert mecha-
nism.
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Type of  law Disclosure (& 
implied due dili-
gence)
Disclosure Due Diligence 
+ Civil Liability 
(fine)
Disclosure Due diligence 
+ Civil liability 
(fines + vulne-
rability to civil 
litigation)
Enforcement Companies 
subject to liability 
for fraudulent or 
false reporting. 
Not liable if  can 
prove statement 
made in good 
faith. No requi-
rement to divest 
from conflict 
mines. The law 
only requires com-
panies to report 
on their mineral 
sourcing and due 
diligence practices. 
Focus not on fines 
or penalties. It is 
designed to incre-
ase disclosure and 
create a ‘name and 
shame’ mechani-
sm with the aim 
of  transparency 
driving change. 
Administrative 
order: Incomple-
te compliance or 
noncompliance 
with disclosure 
requirement may 
result in injuncti-
ve relief  issued 
by the California 
Attorney Ge-
neral.
If  an importer 
or processor 
intentionally, 
knowingly or 
recklessly im-
ports or proces-
ses illegally log-
ged timber they 
could face signi-
ficant penalties, 
including up to 
five years impri-
sonment and/or 
heavy fines. Ho-
wever, there are 
no criminal pe-
nalties (e.g. im-
prisonment) that 
can be applied 
for a breach of  
the due diligence 
requirements 
only civil. 
 Administrative 
order: The se-
cretary of  state 
may seek injun-
ction through 
the High Court 
requiring com-
pliance. 
Subject to san-
ctions on three 
grounds: if  they 
default on com-
mitments made 
in their plan; if  
there are faults 
in the plan or its 
implementation; 
or if  they fail to 
produce a plan at 
all. Administra-
tive orders, civil 
liability: 1. Formal 
notice to comply 
must be followed 
within 3 months 
2. Injunction 
order to com-
ply if  continued 
noncompliance; 
3. Vulnerability 
to civil liability 
claims
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